THE UN AND THE GULF CRISIS, 1990-1999 (A CRITIQUE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY)
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Study’s Historical Context
According to H. N. Brailsford, “the dynamic of history is emotion, not intellect.” Most of the great ideas that have captured men’s imaginations, at least in the modern democratic era, have arisen from an urgent emotional need rather than a strictly rational analysis.
This was especially true of the new international relations concept that emerged from Versailles in 1919. The concept of collective security did not originate with more experienced diplomats and statesmen, who were generally skeptical of it. It came from journalists, moralists, popular politicians, and “the people”; it was a response to a cry of protest against the intolerable existence of world war and a demand for assurance that such wars would not be repeated.
This popular and unsophisticated call for the abolition of war insisted on some visible manifestation of a completely new spirit. Peace planners had to devise a plan to meet this demand, and they scurried around frantically trying to make reason match emotion.
The League of Nations (a poetic rather than an accurate title, because nation is not a political term) was a mystical symbol born of the tumultuous experience of 1914-18, with little to do with logic. However, it quickly gained intellectual respectability, and the world has struggled to make it practical ever since.
It has, indeed, had a remarkable sanctity, with criticism of it almost considered an act of impiety in the United States. This mystical emotion was primarily associated with the Anglo-Saxon peoples. There was some enthusiasm in France, but there was too much method in the French madness.
Italy’s contribution to the League was limited to a strange plan that demonstrated how differently a “proletarian” nation, as Italy referred to itself, viewed the problem: the new international organization should be a device for redistributing the earth’s good things. The defeated powers were disqualified, and Russia was disqualified.
Even if the League belonged primarily to Britain and America, to men like Wilson, Bryce, and Smuts, everyone felt a spiritual need to challenge the no longer tolerable notion that wars are unavoidable. Almost every country has a significant background of such thinking. ‘ Nobody imagined a superpower.
Nationalism was the disposal of the new international organization while all states disarmed; he agreed with his advisers that this was “unconstitutional and also impossible” on sober reflection. 2 Herbert Hoover had already stated that the
United States Government “will not agree to any program that even appears to be inter-Allied control of our resources after peace”—this in response to a suggestion for an inter-national relief organization, and Hoover’s reasoning was that this would not ensure “proper appreciation” of American contributions.
If America couldn’t be altruistic, how much less Europe’s hate-filled peoples? A world government, or the abolition of national states, was unthinkable. Almost everywhere, nationalism had grown as a result of the war. There was a lot of talk about the evils of “selfish nationalism,” but there was no truly international spirit, and no one explained how you could have nationalism without it being selfish—in fact, no one recognized his own nationalism as selfish at all.
Nonetheless, the people demanded assurances that war would not be used to obstruct the elimination of nuclear weapons. It was widely assumed, albeit hazily, that something had gone horribly wrong with the old system, or lack thereof. It was necessary to create a symbol of hope.
The League of Nations, hastily constructed, was established with due solemnity: “The tents have been struck,” said General Smuts, “and the great caravan of humanity is once again on the march.” Unfortunately, it wasn’t clear where it was marching.
The League was supposed to represent a completely new formula for making war obsolete. Collective Security was the phrase. It has never been a clear concept, and even its most ardent supporters admit that they have no idea what it means. 3 As a result of the League of Nations’ “failure,” war was not avoided.
The fact that the idea behind it has not only survived but has grown in strength may be a testament to the desperate plight of the world-faute de mieux.
Or it could simply be a testament to the power of a mystique, the astonishing ability of the modern masses to engage in slogan-thinking, and the weakness of reason when confronted with terrible fears and sincere hopes. In any case, the idea’s logical flaws deserve to be revisited more frequently than they have been.
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THE UN AND THE GULF CRISIS, 1990-1999 (A CRITIQUE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY)
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