ASSOCIATED GAS FLARING AND RE-INJECTION POLICY making AND IMPLEMENTATION IN NIGERIA (1960-2010)
ASSOCIATED GAS FLARING AND RE-INJECTION POLICY MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION IN NIGERIA (1960-2010)
Several oil-producing countries across the world (Norway, the United Kingdom, Venezuela, Canada, and Brazil, among others) have effectively enacted regulatory rules and developed gas reinjection systems to reduce gas flaring and venting in their offshore/onshore oil fields. In contrast, Nigeria has been facing the same gas flaring and venting regulatory regimes without result since 1969.
This study thus investigates the adequacy of consultation and utilisation of indigenous science and technology expert opinion in the formulation and execution of Nigeria's Associated Gas Re-injection Policy.
The study posed one primary research question: Is Nigeria's failure to implement the Gas Re-injection Policy due to a lack of consultation with indigenous scientific and technological advice?
The study's specific objectives are as follows:
(i) to investigate the need for indigenous scientific and technological advice in associated gas re-injection policy-making and implementation in Nigeria's oil industry;
(ii) to assess the extent of consultancy on indigenous scientific and technological expert advice in Associated Gas Re-injection policy-making and implementation processes in Nigeria from 1960 to 2010; and
(iii) to investigate the structure/comparative cost of indigenous scientific The study aims to address a vacuum in the literature by examining the relationship between science, technology, and successful regulatory decisions and implementation in Nigeria's oil industry.
In theory, it aims to improve current awareness of the implications of consulting indigenous scientific and technological competence in policy-making and execution of gas re-injection. The theoretical framework of analysis is based on Ogban-Iyam's Marxian Theory of Social Production and Reproduction.
The premise, “the non-implementation of the Gas Reinjection policy in Nigeria is a function of a lack of consultation with indigenous scientific and technological advice,” was put to the test through logical evidence presentation and analysis.
The Post-Test-Only Control Group Design was used to measure the independent variable in this study, and the One-Shot Case Study Design was utilised to measure the dependent variable. The logic behind the two research designs was to control internal and external validity challenges.
Data was gathered from both primary and secondary sources using the observation and interview methods. Personal interviews were employed to collect information from randomly selected respondents from regulatory agencies, petrobusinesses, and oil-producing communities. The federal government and all of its oil/environment-related policies,
laws, and MDAs, governments of oil producing states and their oil/environment-related policies, laws, and MDAs, Petrobusinesses and their personnel, oil prospecting technologies/activities, and oil-bearing communities, their environment, and socioeconomic conditions comprise the population of this study.
Two major samples for the study were drawn, viz:
(i) a sample of federal and state ministries of environment of three Niger Delta States, viz: Delta, bayelsa and Rivers, and Regulatory Agencies;
(ii) a sample of 9 randomly selected respondents, each from three selected oil-bearing communities, viz: Ojobo (Delta), Imiringi (Bayelsa) and Joinkrama IV (Rivers), using the purposive sampling technique to ensure effective representation of the stakeholder groups.
Finally, both the secondary and primary data obtained in the field were analysed using the basic percentage approach and tabular presentations. The study uncovers not only a lack of consultation/underutilization of indigenous scientific and technological expertise in associated gas re-injection policymaking/implementation, but also a lack of perception, commitment,
learning disposition, and political will (PCLW) among the actors involved in the dynamics of associated gas re-injection policymaking and implementation in Nigeria.
Logically, the latter (poor consultation/utilization of indigenous scientific and technological knowledge in associated gas re-injection policy-making and implementation) came before the former (low quality and quantity of PCLW of associated gas re-injection policy-makers).
To emphasise, the associated gas re-injection policymakers' inadequate quality and quantity of PCLW is key to the failure of associated gas reinjection policies in Nigeria. Specifically, the linked gas re-injection policymakers' inadequate quality and quantity of PCLW resulted in the following factors:
(i) The lack of consultation and underutilization of a few committed indigenous scientists from governmental circles and academia through national consultative and stakeholder forums;
(ii) The non-submission of the goals and alternatives of Nigeria's Associated Gas Re-injection policy to scientific and technological gradations through the scrutiny of committed indigenous scientists,
as well as attendant problems of identification/definition of policies. As a result, gas flare-out dates continue to be missed, and the negative effects on the socioeconomic situations of oil-producing towns in the Niger Delta Region continue unabated.
As a result, this study concludes that until the PCLW of Nigeria's associated gas re-injection policy-makers improves and they positively perceive the dynamics of science and technology in technology-intensive policy-making and implementation, associated gas re-injection policies in Nigeria will remain inadequate and difficult to implement.
Thus, until the status quo in science and technology is changed to benefit the Nigerian environment, the Niger Delta Region will continue to wait in vain for environmentally friendly petroleum prospecting methods to phase out gas flaring and accompanying environmental degradation.
This indigenous science and technology consciousness must begin now, because the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Minister of the Federal Ministry of Niger Delta,
the Minister and Permanent Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources, respectively, and the Director-General of NESREA are all indigenous people from the Niger Delta Region, which bears the brunt of petrobusiness.