ASSOCIATED GAS FLARING AND RE-INJECTION policy MAKING AND implementation IN nigeria (1960-2010)
ASSOCIATED GAS FLARING AND RE-INJECTION POLICY MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION IN NIGERIA (1960-2010)
A number of oil-producing countries across the world (Norway, Britain, Venezuela, Canada, Brazil, etc.) have effectively implemented regulatory policies and gas reinjection technology to reduce gas flaring and venting in their offshore/onshore oil fields. In contrast, Nigeria has struggled with the same gas flaring and venting regulatory systems since 1969.
This study assesses the effectiveness of consulting local science and technology experts when developing and implementing Nigeria's Associated Gas Re-injection Policy. The study raised one significant research question: is the failure to implement the Gas Re-injection Policy in Nigeria due to a lack of consultation with indigenous scientific and technological advice?
The study aims to:
(i) examine the need for indigenous scientific and technological advice in associated gas re-injection policy-making and implementation in Nigeria's oil industry;
(ii) evaluate the extent of consultancy on indigenous scientific and technological expert advice in associated gas re-injection policy-making and implementation processes in Nigeria from 1960 to 2010; and
(iii) compare the structure and costs of The study aims to fill a vacuum in the existing literature by examining the relationship between science, technology, and successful regulatory decisions and implementation in Nigeria's oil industry.
Theoretically, it is intended to improve current awareness of the significance of consulting indigenous scientific and technological competence in gas re-injection policy development and execution.
The theoretical framework is based on Ogban-Iyam's Marxian Theory of Social Production and Reproduction. The premise that the non-implementation of the Gas Reinjection strategy in Nigeria is due to a lack of consultation with indigenous scientific and technological expertise was examined through evidence and analysis.
This study uses two types of research designs:
(i) the Post-Test-Only Control Group Design to assess the independent variable, and
(ii) the One-Shot Case Study Design to measure the dependent variable. The idea behind the two research designs was to mitigate internal and external challenges to validity. Data from primary and secondary sources were collected through observation and interviews. We conducted personal interviews with randomly selected respondents from regulatory agencies, petrobusinesses, and oil-bearing areas.
his study's population consists of all stakeholders and the physical environment of the Nigerian oil industry, including the federal government and all of its oil/environment-related policies, laws, and MDAs, the governments of oil producing states and their oil/environment-related policies, laws, and MDAs, petrobusinesses and their personnel, oil prospecting technologies/activities, and oil-bearing communities, their environment, and socioeconomic conditions.
The study included two major samples:
(i) federal and state ministries of environment from three Niger Delta states (Delta, Bayelsa, and Rivers), as well as regulatory agencies; and
(ii) 9 randomly selected respondents from three oil-bearing communities (Ojobo (Delta), Imiringi (Bayelsa), and Joinkrama IV (Rivers), using purposive sampling to ensure stakeholder representation. The secondary and primary data from the field were analysed using the basic percentage approach and tabular presentation.
The study highlights the underutilization of indigenous scientific and technological expertise in associated gas re-injection policymaking and implementation, as well as low perception, commitment, learning disposition, and political will (PCLW) among stakeholders in Nigeria.
Logically, the latter (poor quality and quantity of PCLW among associated gas re-injection policymakers) came before the former (inadequate consultation and utilisation of indigenous scientific and technological competence in associated gas re-injection policymaking and execution).
To emphasise this point, the low quality and quantity of PCLW among associated gas re-injection policymakers is critical to the failure of associated gas reinjection policies in Nigeria. The low quality and quantity of PCLW among gas re-injection policymakers resulted in the following factors:
(i) Weak consultation and underutilization of the little inputs of a few committed indigenous scientists from governmental circles and academia through the national consultative and stakeholder forums;
(ii) The non-subjection of the goals and alternatives of the Associated Gas Re-injection policy in Nigeria to scientific and technological gradations through the scrutiny of committed indigenous scientists and attendant problems of identification/definition of policies.
As a result, gas flare-out deadlines continue to fail, and the negative impact on the socioeconomic situations of oil-bearing communities in the Niger Delta Region persists. This study suggests that implementing associated gas re-injection policies in Nigeria will be challenging unless policy-makers in the three branches of government improve their PCLW and recognise the importance of science and technology in technology-intensive decision-making.
As a result, unless the status quo in science and technology changes to benefit the Nigerian environment, the Niger Delta Region will continue to wait in vain for environmentally friendly petroleum prospecting technologies to phase out gas flaring and associated environmental degradation.
The President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Minister of the Federal Ministry of Niger Delta, Minister and Permanent Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources, and Director-General of NESREA are all indigenous people from the Niger Delta Region, which is heavily impacted by petrobusiness.