Project Materials

THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATION OF ‘BOKO HARAM’ INSURGENCE IN NIGERIA

ABSTRACT

Nigeria has a long history of religious wars, with the most virulent being those of the ‘Maitatsine’ (1980s) and ‘Boko Haram’ (July 2009). The latter was as intense, organised, and widespread as the former. Given the international focus on global terrorism, it is likely that fundamentalist groups may acquire motivation, material, and theological support or influence from a global jihadist movement. Unresolved national challenges, such as a poor economy, ineffective security and intelligence agencies, and an inability to define national culture and identity, are crucial. The precedent of ‘Maitatsine’, as well as the government’s management of it, show that government ineptitude and a lack of political will have encouraged incurrence (incurrence is the act of making oneself subject to something undesired) and called the state’s capacity into doubt. It examines the emergence of violence under the pretext of religious revivalism and draws connections between the ‘Maitatsine’ and ‘Boko Haram’ uprisings. It examines Nigeria’s response to these revolutions. It concludes that unless the state handles concretely and courageously the conditions that can enable or feed violent religious revivalism, uprisings may occur. This article records and examines the ‘Boko Haram’, as well as its links to the promotion of Islamic revivalism and the challenges it poses to their secularism.

Chapter one

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Boko Haram is an extremist Nigerian Islamist terrorist sect founded in Maiduguri in 2002 by Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf. The sect aspires to impose strict Sharia Islamic law throughout Nigeria, and as the name Boko Haram (roughly translated as “Western education is a sacrilege/sin”) implies, the group believes Nigeria should abandon Western-style education.

The sect became militarily active in 2003 and has since carried out a series of assaults on the Nigerian government, Christian targets (including targeted killings of worshippers and church bombs), and moderate Islamist groups.

Since 2008, the Nigerian government has been tracking down Boko Haram activity, culminating in a five-day revolt in July 2009 that killed hundreds of people, including Mohammed Yusuf.

However, despite increased security measures, the gang has continued to launch attacks. Since its beginning, Boko Haram’s principal regions of focus have been the northern states of Yobe, Kano, Bauchi, Borno, and Kaduna; however, recent trends indicate that the sect’s activities are shifting southward, with attacks reported in Plateau state and Abuja.

PHILOSOPHY

Book Hara is partially based on the Taliban movement in Afghanistan; one of the group’s principal bases in Kanama, Yobe state, was named Afghanistan before being destroyed. The group has also declared professions of solidarity with al-Qaeda and threatened the United States.

Although there is no direct link between ‘Boko Haram’ and the Taiban or al-Qaeda, like its extremist counterparts, ‘Boko Haram’s ideology is based on hostility towards democracy and western anti-Islamic education. Nigeria’s constitution guarantees religious freedom, and the country’s population is roughly divided in half between a Muslim and Christian South.

Book Haram has often said that it aims to impose a strict Sharia law regime over Nigeria; currently, nine northern states follow Sharia law, with another three only partially obeying it.

According to numerous pronouncements, ‘Boko Haram’ also aspires to destroy Western-style education, which it claims is opposed to Islamic principles.

Structure and Organisation

Little is known about ‘Boko Haram’s’ organisational structure. Mohammed Yusuf, the group’s founder and former leader, was regarded to have a high level of education and money.

Although Mohammed Yusuf was murdered by security forces in 2009, his deputy, Abubakar Shebu, who was previously considered to be dead, emerged on video in 2010 and claimed control of the group. Shebu went on to threaten new assaults on Nigeria’s western-influenced government.

Boko Haram adherents often avoid mixing with other Islamist groups in Nigeria, even praying in separate mosques in the main northern cities of Maiduguri, Kano, and Sokoto.

Boko Haram’s lack of education and high unemployment rate in northern Nigeria have provided the group with a seemingly limitless reservoir of angry youth recruits, with Nigeria’s State Security Service estimating that the group has around 540,000 members. The sources come from Jos, Kaduna, Kano, and Abuja, but mainly Madiduguri. (Vanguard newspaper, 23 May 2011)

OPERATIONS AND TACTICS

During Mohammed Yusuf’s leadership, ‘Boko Haram’ carried out a number of low-level attacks against security stations and Christian churches in northern Nigeria. However, the arrest of some of its members by security authorities in July 2009 sparked ‘Boko Haram’ into a general insurrection.

Killings began in Bauchi but quickly spread to Maiduguri and smaller cities across Northern Nigeria. Maiduguri was the worst hit, with over 700 deaths documented.

Following five days of fighting, security troops stormed and demolished ‘Boko Haram’s’ major mosque in Maiduguri, apprehending Mohammed Yusuf.

He was later shot and executed by security agents in questionable circumstances. Following Mohammed Yusuf’s killing and a substantial military deployment in Maiduguri and numerous other regions across northern Nigeria, ‘Boko Haram’ activity in northern Nigeria has almost completely ended.

However, by mid-2010, ‘Boko Haram’ activities had restarted in the region, with the sect claiming responsibility for a series of targeted killings in Maiduguri. Numerous police officers, Christians, and moderate Muslims were killed in drive-by motorbike killings.

Furthermore, in September 200, ‘Boko Haram’ launched an attack on a federal prison in Buachi, liberating roughly 700 convicts, including an estimated 150 former sect members. The attacks occurred shortly after the sect’s former deputy, Shebu, seized leadership of ‘Boko Haram’ and vowed further attacks.

With the majority of its efforts concentrated in northern Nigeria, ‘Boko Haram’ deviated sharply from previous tactics by claiming responsibility for a series of bombings in Jos, the capital of Central Plateau State, on December 24, 2010, which killed at least 80 people; the attacks were claimed by a group called jama’atu ahlus Sunnah lid da’awati wal jihad, a name ‘Boko Haram’ has previously stated it wanted to be known by.

The attacks coincided with ‘Boko Haram’-led raids on Christian churches in Maidugurion the same day. The great degree of operational organizational ability with which the attacks were carried out demonstrates the rising threat that ‘Boko Harma’ holds to the stability ofNigeriaand ushered in a new age of the sect’s activity.

The sources come from Sokoto, Kano, and Abuja, where there was a bomb detonation that killed several persons. Furthermore, although unconfirmed, ‘Boko Haram’ is thought to be responsible for the deaths of scores of people when the mammy market near the Sani Abacha barracks in Abuja was bombed on December 31, 2010. (Vanguard Newspaper, 1 December 2011).

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS

Jos-Civil Right Congress of Nigeria, CRCN, has encouraged the Federal Government to form a presidential contact committee to meet with members of the ‘Boko Haram’ sect as a means of ending the ongoing insurgency.

The group’s president, Mallam Shebu Sani, stated on Sunday that the committee should be led by “a respected and politically neutral elder statesman.”

It highlighted 21 reasons that it claimed contributed to the “Boko Haram problem,” including the extrajudicial assassination of the sect’s head, Mohammed Usuf, and repressive activities against members in 2009.

Other factors cited included “the inspiration from the success of the armed struggle in the Niger Delta, the government’s policy of appeasing militancy, abject poverty and a high rate of unemployment in the northern states, as well as the disconnect between elected and appointed leaders and people.” The new attack occurred in Maiduguri, Borno State.

The group also identified “exclusion of members of the ‘Boko Haram’ sect by mainstream Islamic groups, proliferation of arms in the north east, Chadian Civil War and illegal immigration, absence of data and intelligence about individuals and organisational links with foreign groups, lack of true federalism, resistance of the political establishment to a national conference, the collapse of public schools and the Federal Government’s increasing reliance on foreign security agencies.”

The statement went on to say, “Massive economic aid and investment, particularly in the northeastern states, with all religious sects and groups mainstreamed in border religious bodies.” The sources come from Sokoto, Kano, and Abuja, where there was a bomb detonation that killed several persons. (Ibid, 2011).

1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The study’s goal is to assist the general public and Muslim youth in providing appropriate responses to often asked or anticipated enquiries about the ‘Boko Haram’ situation and tragedy.

It help the Muslim community leaders with qualitative responses to the augments presented by the ‘Boko Haram’ gang to defend their beliefs and perspectives.

1.4 Significance of the Study

Despite substantial security crackdowns, Boko Haram has re-emerged as a serious danger. As a result, rather than weakening the organisation, Mohammed Yusuf’s death appears to have marked the beginning of a new era of ‘Boko Haram’ activities.

Shebu, the sect’s new leader, has brought a new level of sophistication to ‘Boko Haram’, which had previously focused on small-scale bombings, shootings, and kidnappings. Nigeria is a deeply fractured society divided along ethnic, religious, and socioeconomic lines.

As ‘Boko Haram’ draws the majority of its support from dissatisfied youth, unless the Nigerian government addresses some of the country’s pressing socioeconomic needs, the group will undoubtedly continue to pose a threat, with further attacks on government installations, Christian targets, and moderate Muslims highly likely.

There have been suspicions that the resurgent ‘Boko Haram’ attacks are linked to the April 2011 general elections; violence is a common accompaniment to Nigerian elections, and as the previous elections have already proven to be contentious, an increase in ‘Boko Haram’ activity during this period is possible.

Maiduguri, Kano, and Sokoko are among the states that benefited from this research work in the 2011 general election. (Austin and Peter K. 2010).

1.5 Scope of the Study

The study sought to assess the contributions and issues of Nigeria’s Boko Haram insurgency. Boko Haram’s philosophy, as well as the breadth and magnitude of its atrocities, are believed to be developing.

Its targeting of Abuja, particularly the UN, demonstrates a new level of coordination, expertise with explosives (semtex or a similar military grade explosive was used in Abuja), leading to theories of links with other terrorist groups, and, critically, a new choice of international target, which the sect claims is the “forum of all the global evil”

The attack on a beer parlour was purely propaganda. We had heard that it was only soldiers that gathered there to drink, and we confirmed this when we went there and executed them. It also appears that there was a schism in Boko Haram, though this is denied on the group’s website.

In July 2010, the Yusufiya Islamic movement, which claims to be formed by Mohammed Yusuf and, like Boko Haram, presumably has a genealogy from. The Yusufiya sect distributed fliers in Maiduguri, distancing themselves from Boko Haram.

The schism is assumed to be the result of Shekaus’ more extreme philosophy and methods, namely the shift from attacking individuals in northern Nigeria to targeting the UN.

“We are concerned that some people with evil motives have infiltrated our genuine struggle with a false Holy war that is outright UN-Islamic” , a leaflet stated. “I looked at this through Codewit News Online.

1.6 Limitations of the Study

The ‘Boko Haram’ issue in Maiduguri is frequently framed as a conflict between the Joint Task Force (JTF) of military and police forces and members of the Yusufiyya sect.

Many people outside of Maiduguri are unaware of the difficulties faced by ordinary Maiduguri residents and those who must transit and move through the city.

While the gun attacks, explosions, and subsequent massacres and deaths on both sides may be familiar to both local and international media, the issues of human rights, maltreatment, abuse, and other atrocities associated with the security forces’ unofficial mandate leave much to be desired.

It is instructive and a sign of resignation, apathy, and thus a dangerous situation, that in the over three months of the stepping up of ‘Boko Haram’ and JTF battles, killings and counter-killings in Maiduguri, most of the organised civil society, which include trade unions, associations, opinion leaders, traditional rulers, e.t.c, have remained mute, while the average citizen suffers from all the security personnel during the past four months-roughly since the February election.

Nonetheless, the most frequently discussed topic among meat merchants, market vendors, water sellers, taxi drivers, commercial motorcyclists, and all other categories of civilians is how they have suffered individually and collectively as a result of the JTF’s’security’ efforts.

It is dangerous because people have remained silent and are not fighting the cruel and insensitive JEF, but rather licking their wounds in silence, implying that they are not enthusiastic about ‘cooperating’ with these uniformed extortionists and bullies in assisting them in apprehending any ‘Boko Haram’ suspects, assuming they know them, their homes, or have any useful information to share towards those objectives.

Aside from the known inconveniences of opening car boots and bonnets, motorbike and rider searches in the name of checking for weapons, Maidugurici inhabitants have been subjected to dehumanising treatment by the JTF, which continues to this day. One of the reasons is that after the bodily and machinery searches, the person must still pay a fee before being released.

In the Gwange and Lagosbridge areas, it is typical for commercial motorists and cyclists to willingly and in daylight give money to the JTF at roadblocks before proceeding for fear of being beaten or otherwise punished by frog-jumping or lying down on the sun-baked road.

1.7 Definition of Terms

”Boko Haram’ (literally, “people committed to the propagation of the prophet’s Teachings and Jihad”) is a controversial Nigerian terrorist Islamist group that seeks to impose Shariah law in the northern state of Nigeria.

The group’s official name is Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda await wal. Jihad, which in Arabic means “people committed to the propagation of the prophet’s Teachings and Jihad.”

The group’s official name is Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Liddda Awati Wal-jihad, which means “people committed to the propagation of the prophet’s teachings and jihad” in Arabic.

However, residents of Maiduguri, where it was formed in 2002, dubbed it ‘Boko Haram’, which loosely translates from the local Hausa language as “Western education is forbidden.”

The phrase ‘Boko Haram’ is derived from the Hausa word Boko, which means “Animist, Western, or otherwise non-Islamic education,” and the Arabic word Haram, which figuratively means “Sin” (literally, forbidden).

Ideology: ‘Boko Haram’ is opposed to not only western education, but also western culture and modern science. In a 2009 BBC interview, Yusuf argued that the concept that the world is a sphere is antithetical to Islam and should be rejected, along with Darwinism and the theory that rain is caused by water evaporated by the sun.

History: The group was founded in the 1960s (citation needed), but only began to gain popularity in 2002. Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf became its leader in the same year, 2004, when it relocated to Kanamma, Yobe State, where it established a camp known as “Afghanistan” and attacked adjacent police outposts, murdering police officers.

Its adherents are said to be influenced by the Koranic phrase “Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors.” ‘Boko Haram’ promotes a version of Islam that makes it “Haram,” or forbidden, for Muslims to participate in any political or social activity associated with Western society.

This involves participating in elections, wearing shirts and pants, and obtaining a secular education. ‘Boko Haram’ considers the Nigerian state to be ruled by non-believers, even though the country has a Muslim president.

Since the Sokoto Caliphate, which ruled sections of what is now northern Nigeria, Niger, and southern Cameroon, fell under British administration in 1903, Muslims in the region have been resistant to Western education.

Many Muslim families continue to refuse to send their children to government-run “western schools,” an issue exacerbated by the governing elite’s failure to prioritise education. Against this backdrop, the charismatic Muslim preacher Mohammed Yusuf founded ‘Boko Haram’ in Maiduguri in 202.

He established a religious complex, including a mosque and an Islamic school. Many poor Muslim families from Nigeria and neighbouring countries enrolled their children in the school.

But ‘Boko Haram’ was not just interested in education. Its political purpose was to establish an Islamic state, and the institution served as a recruiting ground for jihadists to fight the state.

In Bauchi, the group was reported to be refusing to interact with locals. The community includes members from neighbouring Chad who speak only Arabic. On July 14, 2011, troops in Abuja intercepted a device carrying 700 cartons containing bombs while conducting a normal stop and search.

Clash with the state: In July 2009, Nigerian authorities began investigating the organisation after receiving information that it was arming itself. Several leaders were detained in Buachi, causing fatal skirmishes with Nigerian security forces that resulted in the deaths of around 700 people.

Attacks: Prior to the conflicts, numerous Muslim leaders and at least one military official warned authorities about ‘Boko Haram’. These warnings were reportedly ignored.

Fighters in Yobe state reportedly “used fact-laden motorcycles station.” On July 30, there were reports that Usufu was slain by Nigerian security personnel after being brought into prison.

In January 201, the group struck again in the Nigerian state of Borno, killing four people in the Dela Alemderi neighbourhood of Maiduguri metropolis. On September 7, 201, ‘Boko Haram’ released around 700 detainees from a prison in Bauchi state. In December 2010, ‘Boko Haram’ was blamed for a market bombing, and 92 of its members were captured by authorities.

On Friday, January 28, 2011, a governor candidate, his brother, and four police policemen were slain. On March 29, police “thwarted a plot to bomb a (ANPP) election rally” in Maiduguri, Borno State (map).

The threat was attributed to ‘Boko Haram’. On April 1 (the day before the original date of Nigeria’s parliamentary elections), alleged ‘Boko Haram’ members stormed a Bauchi police station (map).

On April 9, an apolling centre in Maiduguri was bombed. On April 15, the Maiduguri office of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was bombed, and other persons were shot in a separate incident that day. Authorities suspected ‘Boko Haram’.

On April 20, ‘Boko Haram’ murdered a Muslim preacher and ambushed several police officers in Maiduguri. On April 22, ‘Boko Haram’ released 14 detainees during a jailbreak in Yola, Adamawa state (map). On Tuesday, February 8, 2011, ‘Boko Haram’ issued terms for peace.

The radicals requested that Senator Alimodu Sheriff, the Governor of Borno State, resign immediately and allow them to recapture their mosque in Maiduguri, the state’s capital.

On May 9, 2011, ‘Boko Haram’ rejected an amnesty offer presented by Kashim Shetting, the governor-elect of Borno State. ‘Boko Haram’ was responsible for a series of bombings in northern Nigeria on May 29, 2011, that killed 15 people.

On June 17, 2011, the organisation claimed responsibility for a bombing attack on the police force headquarters in Abuja. According to prior officials, the incident was the first suicide bombing in Nigeria, and it specifically targeted Police Inspector General Hafiz Ringim.

According to officials, on June 26, 2011, the set carried out a bombing attack on a beer park in Maiduguri, as witnessed. Militants on motorcycles launched bombs into the drinking establishment, killing approximately 25 individuals.

On June 27, 2011, another attack in Maiduguri, according to the organisation, killed at least two girls and injured three customs officials.

On July 3, 2011, the organisation claimed responsibility for a blast in a beer garden in Maiduguri, which killed at least twenty people. On July 11, 2011, the University of Maiduguri closed down due to security concerns. Sharia in Nigeria, militancy in Nigeria, the Niger Delta, conflicts, Nigerian Sharia conflict, and poverty in Nigeria.

The gang also claimed responsibility for the simultaneous attacks on St. Patrick’s Catholic Church, Gwange Police Station, and Daldal Way Police Station.

‘Boko Haram’ is an Islamic extremist group comprised of both Nigerians and non-Nigerians. Some politicians are sponsoring these groups in order to distort Nigeria’s embryonic democracy.